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Abstract 
In this paper we propose the use of tax payments accruing from the commercialization of 
research findings as a measure of research benefits complementing the existing range of 
evaluation tools. We place this novel approach to assess the economic returns to publicly 
funded research in the context of previous studies and highlight its advantages. The 
application of our method over a long period of time is demonstrated with the example of 
saccharin, which was discovered in the context of a curiosity-driven fundamental research 
project. In our study we focused on Monsanto’s commercial saccharin production finding 
notable returns. 
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1. Introduction 
It is now well established that research – including notably curiosity-driven fundamental 
research – is important for the wealth and economic growth of a country (Vincett 2010; 
Gulbrandsen 2009; Narin et al. 1997; Klevorick et al. 1995; Roessner 1993; Pavitt 1991; Jaffe 
1989; Kay and Llewellyn Smith 1985; Byatt and Cohen 1969; Advisory Council on Scientific 
Policy 1960). The impacts of research on the economy are multidimensional and sometimes 
occur through complex and indirect pathways (Martin and Tang 2006; van Raan 2000). They 
include the creation of new knowledge in its broadest sense (Geiger 2004; Scott et al. 2002; 
Hoppe and Pfähler 2001) – influencing e.g. corporate research (Balconi et al. 2010) or 
productivity (Link 1996) –, the introduction of advanced instrumentation (Price 1984), public 
health benefits (Martin and Tang 2006; Byatt and Cohen 1969), the output of trained 
graduates (Zellner 2003; David et al. 1992), the formation of social networks or ‘invisible 
colleges’ (Price 1984) and of course the commercialization of research findings and 
discoveries (Gulbrandsen 2009). These different types of economic impacts of research have 
received considerable attention in numerous assessment studies, which have been conducted 
in the past for both public accountability reasons and to improve future policy decisions (a 
useful overview can be found in Marjanovic et al. (2009). In general, the majority of these 
studies reported considerable returns on investment for the country funding the research, some 
of them exceeding returns on stock (Arnold and Balázs 1998). 
However, there is no generally applicable method that can take into account all the diverse 
impacts of research introduced above at the same time (Tassey 2003; Arnold and Balázs 
1998). By necessity, previous studies have focused on evaluating selected impacts of research. 
To complement the existing range of techniques, we present in Section 2 a novel approach to 
assess the economic returns to publicly funded research and place it in context of previous 
evaluation studies. We propose the use of tax payments accruing from the commercialization 
of research findings – largely neglected by existing studies – as a measure of the benefits to a 
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particular country. The application of our approach is not limited to a specific kind of research 
(fundamental or applied, curiosity-driven or mission-oriented), as long as it led to identifiable 
tax revenue.  
In Section 3 we demonstrate the application of our approach in detail with an example of a 
curiosity-driven fundamental research project, which serendipitously led to a marketable 
product – saccharin. As the sweetener was discovered already in 1878, the case offered a 
unique long-term valuation perspective, which is rarely provided in the literature. The results 
of the calculations and the implications for the applicability of our method are discussed in 
Section 4. In the final section, we highlight the conclusions that can be drawn from our case 
study and we describe how our method could be implemented in future evaluation studies. 
Besides serving as an example for the implementation of our approach, the saccharin case 
in itself is worth considering, as it presents further evidence that curiosity-driven academic 
fundamental research can lead to successful commercial ventures and to direct paybacks on 
the initial research investment. The history of the case starts in 1876 when Ira Remsen was 
appointed as professor of chemistry at the newly founded Johns Hopkins University in 
Baltimore, MD – the first university in the United States to define research as the core of its 
educational pursuits (Hannaway 1976). His research interests lay in the synthesis of novel 
coal-tar derivatives to work out fundamental chemical principles without having particular 
applications in mind (Getman 1980; Noyes and Norris 1932) and his commitment to 
curiosity-driven research is well-documented (Roth and Lück 2011; Hannaway 1976; 
Kauffman and Priebe 1978). In the course of one research project his fellow Constantin 
Fahlberg synthesized ‘benzoic sulfinide’ in 1878, which was accidentally found to taste 
remarkably sweet. Importantly, Fahlberg did not neglect this finding as unwanted ‘by-
product’ of his research, but instead went on to commercialize what he called saccharin in the 
mid-1880s by founding a company in Germany (Beyer 2005). The large-scale manufacturing 
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of saccharin in the United States began when John F. Queeny in 1901 built up his company 
Monsanto in St. Louis, MO, specifically for the production of saccharin (Forrestal 1977). 
The circumstances of the discovery and the entrepreneurial, regulatory and wartime 
influences on the fate of saccharin as Monsanto’s first product are described elsewhere 
(Forster and Seeger in preparation a, in preparation b). References to other relevant literature 
on saccharin are provided therein as well. We have extended the information provided by 
these publications with data obtained from archival material – an extensive and largely 
untapped source of data for valuations – to compile a solid foundation for our calculations of 
the tax revenue and ultimately of the benefits accruing from Monsanto’s saccharin operations. 
Saccharin was chosen as a case because it allowed for a reasonable demonstration of our 
approach in a comparatively well-defined setting. For instance, it was suitable to limit the 
calculations of the tax revenue to Monsanto, which produced saccharin from 1901 to 1972, as, 
firstly, its corporate records are accessible through the Washington University in St. Louis; 
secondly, it was the first US company to produce the sweetener; thirdly, it was once the 
World’s largest producer of saccharin; fourthly, the discovery of saccharin at a US university 
suggested the consideration of a US company. 
 
2. Method and scope 
The idea to evaluate government financed research is of course not new, be it for general 
quality control, for assessing the influences of policy measures or for public accountability 
due to the presence of many competing and justifiable areas requiring public expenditure such 
as health-care, education or energy (Arnold and Balázs 1998; Luukkonen-Gronow 1987). As 
the focus of the present paper lies on the economic impacts of research, we do not discuss in 
detail widely used methods such as peer review and bibliometrics, which are established in 
assessments of the scientific quality of research, but normally cannot be used to account for 
its economic impacts (Arnold and Balázs 1998; Schmoch and Schubert 2009; Luukkonen-
5 
 
Gronow 1987). Instead, we focus on studies which were conducted for the latter purpose. As 
mentioned before, Marjanovic et al. (2009) provide a useful overview of evaluation studies 
including a historical perspective. The following paragraphs thus serve for illustrating 
purposes only raising no claim to completeness. 
Although the amount of publications dealing with the economic impacts of (publicly 
funded) research is increasing, only a minority of them present numerical estimates for the 
alleged returns. For instance, some of the seminal studies in the field do not include a 
calculation of economic returns. This is the case with Jewkes et al. (1969) who analyzed more 
than 50 inventions – including several cases stemming from corporate R&D departments – 
regarding the environment of their emergence (the first edition was published already in 
1958). The situation looks similar in a very famous study, commonly known by the name 
TRACES, which was commissioned by the National Science Foundation and conducted by 
the IIT Research Institute (1968). 
The paper by Griliches (1958) is still one of the most famous publications actually 
featuring the calculations of return rates. To estimate the input parameters Griliches relied 
mainly on survey data. Also using surveys, Mansfield (1991) attempted to calculate the social 
rate of return from worldwide investments in academic research. Later, Link and Scott (2004) 
used estimates obtained from interviews to assess the benefits and costs related to a specific 
R&D program.  
The returns on (bio-)medical research were studied by Weisbrod (1971) and Fudenberg 
(1973) using their own estimations and official data. Furthermore, the case study by Chien 
and Silverstein (1993) is notable, because the authors applied multipliers provided by the 
Department of Commerce to extend their calculations of the benefits of monoclonal 
antibodies to secondary impacts, such as employment at companies in the supply chain.  The 
framework by Murphy and Topel (2003), by contrast, was based on theoretical assumptions 
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on the benefits accruing from extensions of the life cycle consumptions and the expected 
utilities of individuals.  
Econometric studies represent a further important approach to measure the returns on 
research investments. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991), for instance, used a framework based on 
total factor productivity to examine the association between R&D and productivity growth 
with longitudinal microdata. A comprehensive review of econometric studies is provided by 
Hall et al. (2009). 
Despite the individual attractiveness of each method applied in the studies discussed 
above, none of these approaches can single-handedly take into account all the diverse impacts 
of research, as mentioned in the introduction. Additionally, more or less severe disadvantages 
and biases are associated with the application of these techniques. Survey-based studies, for 
instance, may be subject to flaws resulting from low response rates, untruthful respondents 
and subjective answers (Marjanovic et al. 2009; Salter and Martin 2001: 513; Martin and 
Salter 1996: 13), and it is unclear whether the views expressed by participants should really 
be used as a measure for economic benefits (Luukkonen-Gronow 1987). Econometric studies, 
on the other hand, rely on assumptions that may be unrealistic or unsuited to relate benefits to 
research projects (Salter and Martin 2001: 513); e.g. it is a gross oversimplification to assume 
that companies have invariant production functions and that every innovation impacts existing 
production functions instead of creating new ones (Link 1996: 337; Georghiou and Roessner 
2000: 661; Martin and Salter 1996: 17). Further, these studies suggest that intensifying 
scientific research is profitable for the economy, but they do not differentiate between specific 
research areas (Arnold and Balázs 1998: 2).  
In the following, we suggest the consideration of tax payments accruing from the 
commercialization of research outcomes as a measure to complement the existing range of 
techniques to assess the economic returns to R&D. Our approach can be applied to value 
research projects which led or probably will lead to identifiable tax-relevant impacts arising 
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from new product introductions or economies owing to new knowledge. To obtain meaningful 
results, the application is limited to projects funded by governments or non-profit 
organizations and foundations. Privately funded research should be gauged according to its 
private returns, such as the net operating profit after tax. Still, our approach is an appropriate 
tool to assess various types of research, like academic or industrial research, basic or applied 
research, curiosity-driven or mission-oriented research, development, and past or present 
projects. 
Tax payments present convenient inputs for benefit-cost analyses and calculations of the 
net present value (NPV) or the internal rate of return (IRR). The latter two metrics stemming 
originally from corporate finance allow for comparisons with returns on corporate R&D 
investments and, due to their widespread use in industry, potentially foster the understanding 
by business professionals for such studies (Tassey 2003).  
Our approach has several advantages justifying its application in addition to the 
established methods. It assesses a direct benefit to countries funding research, which has been 
largely neglected by existing studies. The consideration of fiscal income is intuitive, as it is 
clear that these funds can be used to finance new research or to support other areas of 
expenditure. For instance, it is possible to determine how many research projects could be 
funded with the returns on only one single successful program. Furthermore, our approach can 
be executed on different levels of complexity, such as with or without substitution effects or 
taxes arising from secondary impacts, depending on the goal of a study and on the available 
resources. For instance, it can be limited to an in-depth analysis of a well-defined case 
considering a small number of directly involved scientists and companies, as in the case of 
saccharin presented hereafter. Alternatively, it is possible to apply it to a larger number of 
research groups and entire industries including their indirect and induced impacts, if 
appropriate multipliers are available, such as e.g. for the biotechnology industry (Ernst & 
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Young 2000). Depending on the case and the goal of a study, short- or long-term impacts of 
the involved research projects can be considered. 
Recently, Linquiti (2012) suggested including risk in the ex-post valuation of R&D. His 
reasoning can be considered in studies using our approach as well, but it should be noted that 
the author excluded basic research, as it entails great uncertainties, which cannot be easily 
quantified. 
Our method can draw on different data sources, which have to be selected according to 
their availability. In a historic example like saccharin the use of archival material, such as 
annual reports, meeting minutes and industry publications, might be necessary to complement 
publicly available data making a study more laborious. In other cases, for instance regarding 
the biotechnology industry, published documents should be sufficient to retrieve the relevant 
numbers. For very recent examples and forward projecting studies it is even conceivable to 
obtain data from involved companies directly. 
Finally, a further advantage of our method is the consideration of actual cash flows, which 
involves fewer assumptions compared to e.g. econometric tools. 
Of course it should be remarked that the preparation of evaluation case studies using our 
approach entails the same issues inherent to case studies in general (Martin and Tang 2006; 
Salter and Martin 2001): performing case studies is time-consuming and their results are 
difficult to generalize. Further, the focus on a few research projects leading to the desired 
detailed understanding might concomitantly limit the view for the big picture. Case studies 
have also been critiqued because they tend to consider successful projects only. However, 
Scherer and Harhoff (2000) argue that in a portfolio of research projects there are always just 
a few successful ones, which may or may not cover the expenses of the remaining projects.  
In the following section, we use the discovery and commercialization of saccharin to 
demonstrate the application of our approach. 
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3. Example of application: saccharin 
 
As mentioned before, we chose to demonstrate our approach with saccharin as a well-
defined example, limiting our focus on Remsen’s research group at The Johns Hopkins 
University and on Monsanto’s commercial production of the sweetener. Hereafter we assess 
the public returns on the investment in Remsen’s curiosity-driven fundamental research 
project, ignoring Fahlberg’s private development costs and all private rates of return.1 Data 
regarding the research expenses of the Remsen group were found in the Special Collections of 
The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, MD. Figures related to the commercialization of 
saccharin were retrieved from Monsanto’s company records held by the Archives of the 
Washington University in St. Louis, MO, and additionally from government publications 
available through the internet or at the National Archives in College Park, MD. 
We start by presenting the calculations of the tax payments accruing from Monsanto’s 
saccharin operations, as this is the core of our approach. This is challenging for the evaluator, 
as the company of course did not break its tax payments down into the shares of individual 
products. One of our main tasks was, therefore, to find appropriate assumptions to estimate 
saccharin’s share in the total taxes paid by Monsanto during the 72 years of saccharin 
production. In the following, the rationales for the calculations in the individual years are 
presented. Years having similar or identical rationales were consolidated in respective tables. 
The history of saccharin as Monsanto’s first product has been discussed elsewhere (Forster 
and Seeger in preparation b) and is only repeated below as far as necessary for understanding. 
Table 1 summarizes historical milestones. 
  
1 Although Remsen’s research was funded by the endowment of Johns Hopkins, he was free to pursue projects 
satisfying his own curiosity. He was not obliged to consider possible interests of a sponsor. Therefore, it is 
legitimate to use the saccharin case as a proxy for publicly funded curiosity-driven research. 
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Table 1. Key events in the history of Monsanto related to saccharin 
Year Event 
1878 Discovery of saccharin by Fahlberg supervised by Remsen at The Johns Hopkins University 
1887 Market introduction of saccharin in Germany by Fahlberg, List & Co. 
1901 Formation of Monsanto Chemical Works in St. Louis specifically for the production of saccharin 
1902 Production of saccharin Monsanto commenced 
Start of price war by incumbent German companies 
1903 First exports of saccharin Monsanto 
1904 Expansion of Monsanto’s product portfolio 
1905 Monsanto’s first profitable year 
1912–59 Implementation of Food Inspection Decision (FID) 135/142 curtailing US saccharin market 
1914–8 Sugar shortage during World War I leading to high saccharin demand and prices 
1920 Largest producer of saccharin in the World due to competitors’ problems in World War I 
1925 Legal proceedings against Monsanto violating FID 142 ended after hung jury 
No domestic competitor in the saccharin market left 
1941–5 Sugar shortage during World War II leading to high saccharin demand 
1950 Introduction of cyclamate sweeteners by Abbott 
1952 Market entry of Maumee Chemical Company using an alternative synthesis process for saccharin 
1963–5 Repeated considerable expansion of capacity to satisfy demand 
1964– Pricing pressure due to domestic and foreign competition 
1972 Management decision to shut down Monsanto’s saccharin production 
Source: Forster and Seeger (in preparation b). 
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The St. Louis businessman John F. Queeny founded his company Monsanto in 1901 
specifically for the manufacturing of saccharin. Operations commenced on 6 March 1902. For 
the early years up to 1924, no annual accounts of the taxes paid by Monsanto were found in 
the company records. Therefore, the approximate tax burden is calculated using the 
appropriate tax rates, which are detailed in appendix A. Starting in 1924, the annual 
provisions for income taxes are available from Monsanto’s annual reports.2 These values are 
used for the calculation of the fiscal income generated by saccharin from 1924 until its 
production by Monsanto ceased in 1972. 
The estimation of the annual share of saccharin in Monsanto’s total tax payments is 
tedious and has to be adapted according to the data available for the respective years. 
Whenever possible, the saccharin turnover as a percentage of total sales was calculated as a 
proxy for its share in taxes. The capital bound for the production of saccharin, which would 
be needed for an exact calculation of the property tax, or the profitability of the saccharin 
operations, required for a precise determination of the income tax, are unknown for almost the 
entire time span. With exception of the years 1901 to 1903, during which the share is 
unambiguous as there was only one product, three scenarios were developed for saccharin’s 
share in taxation for each year. The base (medium) scenario calculated with the sales proxy 
mentioned above implies that the profitability of the saccharin operations represents exactly 
the average profitability of all Monsanto products – an assumption, which cannot be applied 
2 The annual reports are contained in the Monsanto Company Records (hereafter: MCR) held by the University 
Archives, Department of Special Collections, Washington University Libraries, St. Louis, MO. Annual reports 
1924–49: series 36, box 1; annual reports 1950–63: series 8, box 2; annual reports 1964–72: series 8, box 4. Pre-
1924 figures (total assets, total sales) were extracted from: Foristall, T. M. ‘The Merit of Monsanto’, BARRON’S 
The National Financial Weekly, 3 July 1933, 6, series 10, box 1, folder Chemical Industry (General History 
[1900–1950]); Monsanto Chemical Company and Subsidiary Companies Financial Data, ca. 1953, series 10, box 
4, folder Finance (History); Letter by John F. Queeny to A. C. F. Meyer, Cashier, South Side Bank of St. Louis, 
18 January 1911, series 10, box 4. 
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to the entire time series, as described below. Beginning with the medium scenario, a high (+ 
50 per cent) and a low scenario (– 50 per cent) were developed. Based on all the available 
information for the respective years contained in annual reports, government publications, 
internal documents etc., one of these three scenarios was chosen as the realistic one. A 
detailed example for one year with comments on every calculation step is provided in 
appendix B. Additional comments on the year by year calculations, which are not essential for 
the main argument, can be found in appendix C. 
The total fiscal income generated by Monsanto’s saccharin operations is provided in four 
different ways: the mentioned high (H), medium (M) and low (L) scenarios, and the realistic 
scenario, which represents the sum of all values considered realistic in the individual years. 
For clarity reasons, only the realistic scenario is shown in each of the tables below, which 
indicate the scenario (H/M/L) selected as the realistic one. 
As saccharin was Monsanto’s first and – until the introduction of caffeine in 1904 – only 
product, all taxes paid in the years 1901 through 1903 and a large part of 1904’s taxes (as in 
the medium scenario) are attributable to saccharin.3 Although Monsanto’s operations yielded 
a loss in each of these four years, the tax was due on property and it is therefore assumed that 
it had to be paid anyway. From 1905 to 1907, Monsanto introduced several new products, 
such as vanillin, iron, bismuth, thymol and phenacetin,4 most likely associated with a 
reduction of saccharin’s share in bound capital and thus taxes. In 1905, we begin to apply our 
high/medium/low scenario framework, explaining the tax fluctuation from 1904 to 1905.  
  
3 In 1904, the three scenarios were not developed according to the general rule described in the text, because it is 
very probable that the capital bound in saccharin production is still very high. 
4 Ledgers Sales, Cash Receipts, Mchds Charges, Mchds Credits Jan 1906–Jan 30 1907 and Sales, Cash & 
Journal Feb 1907–Jan 1908, MCR, series 10, sub-series 2, flat box 33.  
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Table 2. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1901–8) 
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1901 N 0 0 0 5000 0.55‡ 28‡ 28‡ 
1902 N 21,870 21,870 100 18,500 0.55‡ 102‡ 102‡ 
1903 N 39,275 39,275 100 27,200 0.55‡ 150‡ 150‡ 
1904 N n/d 36,456 n/a 35,100 0.55‡ 193‡ 164‡ 
1905 M 112,000 33,338 30‡ 46,600 0.55‡ 256‡ 115‡ 
1906 M 120,000 33,005 28‡ 76,900 0.55‡ 423‡ 118‡ 
1907 M 151,300 29,856 20‡ 96,900 0.55‡ 533‡ 107‡ 
1908 M 168,200 n/d n/a 117,300 0.55‡ 645‡ 129‡ 
n/d: no data; n/a: not applicable; estimated values; ‡ calculated values; N: not according to high/medium/low; 
M: medium 
Sources: see text 
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According to notes from Jules Bebie’s diary – Bebie was one of three skilled Swiss 
chemists working for Queeny (Forster and Seeger in preparation b) – Monsanto made $8,000 
profits on saccharin sales in 1910. This corresponds to 10.53 per cent of all profits, if products 
with negative returns are not considered.5 The percentage can directly be applied to calculate 
the share in income taxation, as there is no need to produce three scenarios from a profit 
figure. The income tax in 1909 is calculated retrospectively with the same value. The share in 
property taxation is estimated to be the same as in the previous years, as no new products 
were introduced (Forrestal 1977: 260). A notable increase in assets from 1909 to 1910 
explains the higher tax payments in 1910.  
5 ‘Annual statement for 1910 shows very satisfactory results. [...] Made $54,000 on caffeine with 1$ profit per 
pound, about $8000 each on saccharin and phenolphthalein, $6000 on chloral hydrate, small loss on phenacetin, 
10,000 loss on vanillin.’ Jules Bebie’s diary, ca. 1911, MCR, series 10, box 5, folder Monsanto Company 
History (Historical Accounts [Bebie, Jules]). 
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In the leaflet ‘Information regarding Monsanto for purchasers of Mortgage’, issued in 
1920, the only kind of taxes mentioned for the years 1915 through 1919 are federal taxes.6 
The reason possibly is that property taxes were small compared to income taxes during those 
years, as profits in excess of pre-war earnings were charged heavily, which increased 
Monsanto’s income tax burdens disproportionately. Consequentially, property taxation is no 
longer considered for the calculations of the remaining years until 1924, when the total taxes 
paid by Monsanto become available from its annual reports anyway. As the federal taxes in 
the leaflet are only provided in the form of a sum over 1915 through 1919 ($2,164,850), the 
income tax paid in each individual year is still calculated using the income tax rates (including 
excess profits tax) and saccharin’s share in total sales.7  
The considerable increase in tax payments accruing from the saccharin operations from 
1915 to 1917 can be explained by several influencing factors: firstly, incomes were markedly 
heavier taxed during the War; secondly, sales reached new records every year; thirdly, the 
scenario was changed from medium to high from 1916 to 1917. The subsequent decrease in 
1918 and 1919 is due to lower relative profits and saccharin’s lower share in those profits. 
  
6 10 March 1920, MCR, series 14, box 22, folder Queeny, J.F. (scrapbooks [copies of]). 
7 As Seater (1982) notes, his excess profit tax rates are weighted averages of graduated rates. As it is not possible 
to derive the exact rate applicable to Monsanto, the stated average rates are used for the calculations. Thereby, it 
is not discriminated between normal and excess profits, as the application of the excess tax rate to the entire 
income still underestimates the total tax burden from 1915 through 1919 (approximately $910,000 from our 
calculations versus more than $2 million stated in the leaflet ‘Information regarding Monsanto for purchasers of 
Mortgage’). 
17 
 
                                                          
   
Table 4. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1915–9) 
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1915 M 1,240 171 14‡ 561 1 14‡ 793‡ 
1916 M 2,929 720 25‡ 905 2 25‡ 4616‡ 
1917 H 4,297 1,475 34‡ 775 29 52‡ 163,772‡ 
1918 H 9,672 2,701 28‡ 322 42.5 42‡ 99,246‡ 
1919 H 7,068 1,318 19‡ 873 31.5 28‡ 111,135‡ 
estimated values; ‡ calculated values; M: medium; H: high 
Sources: see text 
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The time period between 1919 and 1942 lacks information about the value or amount of 
Monsanto’s saccharin sales. Data about the sales of saccharin and – later – flavors in general, 
provided by the United States Tariff Commission’s reports on synthetic organic chemicals,8 
served as an estimation basis for these years, but these estimations are of course marred by 
uncertainty. In 1920, the total production of the saccharin industry plummeted to 25 per cent 
of the 1919 figure, because sugar became more readily available again after the war.9 This 
translates together with markedly reduced tax rates into the large difference between the tax 
payments of the two years. 
As Monsanto was the largest of five saccharin producers in the United States after the War 
and, until 1925, squeezed every one of its rivals out of the market (Forster and Seeger in 
preparation b), it is assumed that the company’s share of the total market was 80 per cent 
already in 1920. Furthermore, this also implies to use the medium scenarios for the 
calculation of saccharin’s tax burden during those years. Regarding Table 5, the tenfold 
increase of tax payments from 1922 to 1923 resulted from significantly better total net 
incomes. 
  
8 These reports can be downloaded from <http://archive.org/details/syntheticorganic19yyunit> (substitute yy for 
respective years), last access: 12 July 2013. 
9 Ballinger, R. A., United States Department of Agriculture, Noncaloric Sweeteners: Their Position in the 
Sweetener Industry (hereafter: Ballinger), May 1967, RG 88, box 3978, folder 482 1967, National Archives II, 
College Park, MD. 
19 
 
                                                          
  
  
Table 5. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1920–3) 
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1920 M 419 80 4‡ 772 11.5 4‡ 4,000‡ 
1921 M 522 85 12‡ (132) 11.5 12‡ 9,240a‡ 
1922 M 630 80 14‡ 53 13.5 13.5‡ 1,064‡ 
1923 M 662 90 15‡ 447 13.5 15‡ 10,420‡ 
estimated values; ‡ calculated values; M: medium 
a Monsanto recorded a loss in that year making it impossible to determine the tax burden using the income tax 
rate. The balance sheet in the annual report shows a liability ‘federal income taxes (in dispute)’ worth 
$77,332.07. The item is not reoccurring in 1922’s annual report, so that it is assumed that the balance was paid 
by Monsanto. Saccharin’s share in taxation of 1921 is therefore calculated on this basis. 
Sources: see text 
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As there were only two producers left in the market in 1924, the United States Tariff 
Commission omitted the detailed reporting of saccharin production and sales figures for 
competitive reasons. Therefore, these numbers had to be estimated for the year 1924 and all 
subsequent years until 1942 using the production and sales figures of the entire flavor 
category. Furthermore, saccharin market prices are unknown for the years 1925 through 1938. 
For the interpolation it was assumed that the prices steadily fell from their 1925 level to 
1938’s level.10 Concomitantly, the ratio of the price of toluene – an important precursor in 
Monsanto’s saccharin synthesis – in respect of the saccharin price rose from 0.19 in 1925 to 
0.23 in 1938 curtailing the margin. As it is probable that Monsanto was able to capitalize on 
learning effects in its saccharin production, it is nevertheless assumed that the medium 
scenario for saccharin’s share in taxation is realistic. 
In 1922, saccharin sales made up 50 per cent of the dollar value of all flavor category 
sales, but as new products were introduced, this ratio dropped. For instance in 1924, all 
products, for which detailed figures could not be published, accounted for 39 per cent of the 
total flavor sales value and for only for 19 per cent of the sales volume. It is obvious that 
saccharin is bound to those two limits, but considering its sales volume and value in the early 
1920s, it seems that it must represent the bulk of these residual numbers.11 As mentioned 
before, starting in 1924 Monsanto’s total income tax payments became available from its 
annual reports explaining the difference between 1923 and 1924. The fluctuations of the 
values in Table 6 themselves are mainly caused by the indirect calculation based on the total 
10 Falling prices are rather unexpected, as Monsanto was the only U.S. producer beginning in 1925. However, 
this might have been a good strategy to render the market unattractive for newcomers or to counter imports. 
Maybe, the introduction of the insulin therapy in the twenties also influenced saccharin pricing. Later, during the 
economic downturn, pressure on prices was generally high. 
11 A further rationale for a rather high percentage of saccharin sales in respect of total residual flavor sales is the 
possible underreporting from Monsanto as in the year 1919. 
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flavor category sales, as introduced above, which depend on the faithful reporting of the 
involved companies. Further influences include a marked increase in Monsanto’s total income 
taxes from 1927 to 1928 and a considerable decrease from 1929 to 1930 as well as the 
acquisition of Merrimac Chemical Company in 1929 resulting in higher group sales (Forrestal 
1977: 74). 
22 
 
   
Table 6. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1924–35) 
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1924 M 1,471 574 563‡ 4,045 14‡ 30 4,200‡ 
1925 M 1,409 402 387‡ 4,822 8‡ 31 2,480‡ 
1926 M 1,483 386 379‡ 5,090 7.5‡ 62 4,650‡ 
1927 M 1,435 438 362‡ 5,553 6.5‡ 82 5,330‡ 
1928 M 1,296 408 368‡ 6,149 6‡ 170 10,200‡ 
1929 M 3,517 440 379‡ 17,088 2‡ 230 4,600‡ 
1930 M 2,739 356 324‡ 13,487 2.25‡ 105 2,363‡ 
1931 M n/d n/d n/d 13,126 2 172 3,440‡ 
1932 M n/d n/d n/d 11,408 2 232 4,640‡ 
1933 M 1,797 368 312‡ 15,497 2‡ 422 8,440‡ 
1934 M 1,929 386 254‡ 17,544 1.5‡ 482 7,230‡ 
1935 M 2,095 492 332‡ 24,706 1.25‡ 645 8,063‡ 
n/d: no data; estimated values; ‡ calculated values; M: medium 
Sources: see text 
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In 1936, the structure of the U.S. Tariff Commission’s publication ‘Dyes and Other 
Synthetic Organic Chemicals in the United States’ was revised. From then on, flavors and 
perfume materials were reported as one group, while concomitantly discriminating between 
substances of coal-tar and non-coal-tar origin. Consequently, the number of products in 
saccharin’s category increased significantly, rendering comparisons less meaningful. 
Therefore, it was simply assumed that the sales volume of saccharin increased slightly but 
steadily until the beginning of World War II, when the demand rose sharply due to shortages 
in sugar supply (United States Tariff Commission 1946). The prices for 1938 to 1941 were 
extracted from an official document prepared by Monsanto.12 
  
12 Report in Connection with Renegotiation of War Contracts for the Year Ended December 31, 1942, 1943, 
MCR, series 10, box 7, folder Monsanto Company History (World War II [Re-negotiation of War Contracts 
(1942)]). 
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Table 7. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1935–41) 
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1935 M 255 1.3 332‡ 24,706 1.25‡ 645 8,063‡ 
1936 M 260 1.2 312‡ 28,848 1‡ 1,029 10,290‡ 
1937 M 265 1.1 292‡ 33,202 0.75‡ 1,030 7,725‡ 
1938 M 270 1.0 266‡ 31,935 0.75‡ 854 6,405‡ 
1939 M 275 1.0 278‡ 44,075 0.5‡ 1,508 7,540‡ 
1940 H 280 1.2 329‡ 45,608 1.13‡ 3,508 39,465‡ 
1941 H 500 1.3 601‡ 63,756 1.5‡ 9,609 144,135‡ 
estimated values; ‡ calculated values; M: medium; H: high; 1935 is shown for comparative reasons 
Sources: see text 
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Saccharin sales values and prices for the years 1942 and 1943 are known from Monsanto 
documents, which allow a more precise estimation of saccharin’s share in taxation for these 
two years.13 According to the United States Tariff Commission, high production levels still 
prevailed in 1944 and 1945. For the years 1946 through 1949 it was assumed that saccharin 
production volumes and prices steadily moved to their level of 1950, for which internal 
Monsanto figures were found.14 
 
13 Report in Connection with Renegotiation of War Contracts for the Year Ended December 31, 1942 (resp. 
1943), 1943 (resp. 1944), MCR, series 10, box 7, folder Monsanto Company History (World War II [Re-
negotiation of War Contracts (1942, resp. 1943)]). 
14 A. P. Kroege, List of products of which Monsanto is the major producer, 21 November 1951, MCR, series 1, 
box 5, folder Organic Chemicals Division (Sales). 
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Table 8. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1942–50) 
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1942 H 1,073‡ 1.3 1,393 69,147 3‡ 11,001 330,030‡ 
1943 H 1,217‡ 1.1 1,393 81,697 2.63‡ 10,085 264,731‡ 
1944 H 1,400 1.1 1,540‡ 86,996 2.63‡ 10,033 263,366‡ 
1945 H 1,400 1.1 1,540‡ 95,339 2.25‡ 9,856 221,760‡ 
1946 M 1,300 1.1 1,430‡ 101,767 1.5‡ 6,430 96,450‡ 
1947 M 1,250 1.2 1,438‡ 143,403 1‡ 10,176 101,760‡ 
1948 M 1,200 1.2 1,464‡ 161,609 1‡ 10,129 101,290‡ 
1949 M 1,200 1.3 1,560‡ 165,925 1‡ 10,823 108,230‡ 
1950 M 1,207 1.4‡ 1,679 227,135 0.75‡ 27,789 208,418‡ 
estimated values; ‡ calculated values; M: medium; H: high 
Sources: see text 
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No data about Monsanto’s saccharin production are available until 1958. In the early 
1950s, Abbott introduced its cyclamate sweeteners to the market. However, in the beginning, 
cyclamates were no real threat to saccharin, due to their higher price.15 It was even suggested 
that the introduction might have been beneficial for saccharin as many states were 
reconsidering their strict regulations toward saccharin and because combination products of 
saccharin and cyclamates were sold.16 It is thus assumed that Monsanto’s output stayed flat 
and eventually slightly declined as the Maumee Chemical Company entered the field with a 
novel production process for saccharin in 1952. According to the United States Department of 
Agriculture, prices were fairly constant.17 However, Monsanto felt compelled to reduce its 
prices in late 1959 to counter Japanese imports.18 Therefore, it seems appropriate to use the 
low scenarios for the calculation of the taxes attributable to saccharin from 1959 to 1962, 
when the demand and therefore capacity usage were rising again. 
  
15 Ballinger. 
16 ‘Sweetness Sans Sucrose’, Chemical Week, 13 October 1951, RG 88, box 3978, folder 482 1967, National 
Archives II. 
17 Ballinger. 
18 Press release relating to saccharin price cuts, 26 October 1959, MCR, series 3, box 3, folder Saccharin 
(History). 
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Table 9. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1951–9) 
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1951 M 1,143‡ 1.4 1,600 272,845 0.5‡ 38,643 193,215‡ 
1952 M 1,143‡ 1.4 1,600 266,704 0.5‡ 18,088 90,440‡ 
1953 M 1,000‡ 1.5 1,500 340,617 0.45‡ 23,060 103,770‡ 
1954 M 933‡ 1.5 1,400 341,823 0.45‡ 18,854 84,843‡ 
1955 M 875‡ 1.6 1,400 522,349 0.3‡ 36,898 110,694‡ 
1956 M 906‡ 1.6 1,450 541,883 0.3‡ 30,764 92,292‡ 
1957 M 938‡ 1.6 1,500 567,116 0.3‡ 29,862 89,586‡ 
1958 M 1,011‡ 1.6 1,617 547,557 0.3‡ 23,052 69,156‡ 
1959 L 1,000‡ 1.6 1,600 616,377 0.13‡ 36,796 45,995‡ 
estimated values; ‡ calculated values; M: medium; L: low 
Sources: see text 
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The early sixties saw a rapid increase in consumption of non-caloric sweeteners, as people 
started to use non-caloric sweeteners to control their weight and to reduce sugar intake, even 
if not medically necessary.19 The increased demand led Monsanto to expand its saccharin 
production capacity by 50 per cent to about 1.8 million pounds annually by 1963 and again in 
1965 to more than 3 million pounds annually.20 Saccharin’s share in Monsanto’s total sales 
was now only in the range of 0.1–0.2 per cent.21 Despite the favorable position in the market, 
we used the low scenarios for the calculations of saccharin’s share in taxation starting in 1965 
until Monsanto’s exit of the saccharin market in 1972, as the company had to lower the prices 
again to counter imports in 1964 and deplored pricing pressure in the saccharin market in its 
1969 annual report in spite of record sales.22 Finally, in 1972, Monsanto stopped production 
of saccharin because of poor performance due to the competition of Sherwin-Williams and 
Japanese imports. At this point we cease the estimation of saccharin tax data.  
 
19 Ballinger. 
20 Monsanto, 1962 annual report, 1963, MCR, series 8, box 2, and press release relating to increased saccharin 
production capacities, series 3, box 3, folder Saccharin (History). 
21 Letter to the honorable James J. Delaney, member of the House of Representatives, by Charles C. Edwards, 
Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 25 May 1970, RG 88, box 4609, folder 482 ‘Saccharin’ 1970–March 9 1972 
Vol. I, National Archives II. This estimate was used to calculate Monsanto’s 1970 saccharin sales. 
22 Press release relating to saccharin price reduction, 5 August 1964, MCR, series 3, box 3, Saccharin (History). 
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Table 10. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1960–72) 
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1960 L 1,200 1.4 1,680‡ 890,114 0.08‡ 58,793 44,095‡ 
1961 L 1,200 1.5 1,776‡ 932,916 0.08‡ 58,384 43,788‡ 
1962 M 1,150 1.6 1,794‡ 1,063,195 0.15‡ 62,915 94,373‡ 
1963 M 1,200 1.6 1,920‡ 1,192,270 0.15‡ 77,416 116,124‡ 
1964 M 1,600 1.5 2,432‡ 1,358,678 0.2‡ 99,178 198,356‡ 
1965 L 1,800 1.4 2,520‡ 1,468,147 0.08‡ 79,638 59,729‡ 
1966 L 1,900 1.4‡ 2,682‡ 1,611,881 0.08‡ 76,420 57,315‡ 
1967 L 2,100 1.3‡ 2,795‡ 1,632,357 0.08‡ 66,469 49,852‡ 
1968 L 2,100 1.4‡ 2,862‡ 1,792,938 0.08‡ 82,107 61,580‡ 
1969 L 2,500 1.3‡ 3,295‡ 1,938,838 0.08‡ 73,473 55,105‡ 
1970 L 2,708‡ 1.5‡ 3,943‡ 1,971,632 0.1‡ 35,017 35,017‡ 
1971 L 2,200 1.4 3,080‡ 2,087,100 0.05‡ 65,700 32,850‡ 
1972 L 1,800 1.4 2,520‡ 2,225,400 0.05‡ 80,600 40,300‡ 
estimated values; ‡ calculated values; M: medium; L: low 
Sources: see text 
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The tax payments presented in the tables above seem to be quite substantial. To make a 
meaningful assertion as to whether these values are still significant when compared to the 
research expenses, they have to be converted into a form that allows such comparisons. The 
question was approached in two different ways: on the one hand, we discounted all the fiscal 
incomes to the year 1876 – as a preparation for the calculation of the benefit to cost ratio – 
and on the other hand we considered the incomes in individual years indexed with the 
consumer price index.  
For the calculations we used annual figures of long term U.S. government bonds as 
discount rates. These are also officially applied by the Office of Management and Budget to 
estimate the returns on government investment projects (Tassey 2003). The sum of all the 
discounted tax payments is considerable in each of the four scenarios, as can be inferred from 
Table 11.23  
  
23 The values of the years 1919–72, as well as 1876–99 were discounted using the yields of long-term U.S. 
government bonds (series Cj1192 in Carter et al. (2006)). The values of the years 1900–18, for which data from 
U.S. government level is lacking, were discounted using yields of long-term high-grade municipal bonds (series 
Cj1193), which do not differ substantially from the values in Cj1192 in the years when both are available. 
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Table 11. Sum of tax payments in the four scenarios discounted using yields of long-term U.S. government 
bonds 
Scenario Realistic High Medium Low 
Value in 1876 $419,152 $576,579 $384,447 $192,306 
Indexed to 2011a $9,070,000 $12,500,000 $8,320,000 $4,160,000 
a Adjusted using the purchasing power calculator by Lawrence Officer and Samuel H. Williamson, 
MeasuringWorth, www.measuringworth.com (last access 10 June 2013), 2011 
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The correspondence between Remsen and Gilman – the first president of The Johns 
Hopkins University – reveals information about the funds available to Remsen for his 
research projects when he acceded to his post. The relevant letters of the two men have been 
discussed in detail elsewhere (Forster and Seeger in preparation a). Using the values provided 
in the letters and with some additional estimation, it is possible to calculate the expenses of 
Remsen’s research group in the years around the saccharin discovery. To render the 
calculations more realistic, we assume that saccharin was discovered in the context of a 
research project lasting five years and we estimate the costs accordingly, although the 
discovery already happened during the second project year. In the beginning, when Remsen 
came to The Johns Hopkins University, $5,000 was invested for chemicals and apparatus and 
further $1,000 for scientific literature (ibid.). Remsen’s salary was distributed over the five 
years as follows: $3,000 in 1877 and 1878, $3,500 in 1879 and 1880, and $4,000 in 1881. 
Further assuming recurring cost of chemicals, consumables and literature of $1,500 per year 
from 1878–81 and a yearly increase in the number of assistants from one in 1877 to five in 
1881, each at a salary of $1,000, the expenses total $44,000 or $38,107 when discounted with 
the relevant rates (Table 12). 
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Table 12. Estimation of the annual expenses of Remsen’s research group (1876–81) 
Year Interest rate [%] Discount factor Expenses [$] Discounted [$] 
1876 3.66 1.0366 6,000 5,788 
1877 3.81 1.0760 4,000 3,717 
1878 3.97 1.1187 6,500 5,810 
1879 3.96 1.1630 8,000 6,878 
1880 3.63 1.2052 9,000 7,467 
1881 3.13 1.2430 10,500 8,447 
Total expenses   44,000 38,106 
Indexed to 2011a   953,000 825,000 
a Adjusted using the purchasing power calculator by Lawrence Officer and Samuel H. Williamson, 
MeasuringWorth, www.measuringworth.com (last access 10 June 2013), 2011 
Sources: Forster and Seeger (in preparation a) 
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Comparing the expenses with the discounted tax revenues the values imply that – in the 
realistic scenario – more than ten research projects of a similar scale could be funded in 1876 
with the income generated by saccharin as just one successfully commercialized outcome of 
such a project. The benefit to cost ratio is thus more than ten to one and the net present value 
in 1876 was $381,046. 
When using a constant interest rate over the entire duration (1876–1972), instead of 
choosing the interest rates of each individual year, and setting the difference of the discounted 
incomes and expenses to zero, the internal rate of return (IRR) is obtained. In this metric, a 
project is profitable as long as its IRR is greater than the cost of capital. 
0 = � 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)(𝑖𝑖−1875) − � 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹ℎ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)(𝑖𝑖−1875)1881
𝑖𝑖=1876
1972
𝑖𝑖=1901
 
Calculating the IRR for the four saccharin scenarios, we obtain the values in Table 13. 
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Table 13. Internal rates of return for the four scenarios 
Scenario Realistic High Medium Low 
IRR1876 7.68% 7.99% 7.20% 5.93% 
Sources: see text 
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Compared to the rates that would be expected for corporate projects, these values may 
seem small. Nevertheless, in the realistic, high and medium scenarios, the values are more 
than twice as big as the average interest paid on long-term government bonds, which makes 
the venture profitable. 
The second way we chose to approach the question is based on the consideration of 
individual years instead of discounting and aggregating the values as above. Thereby, the 
income in each individual year is compared to the research expenses of an average year of the 
research project. The meaning of this approach is different from the previous one, as it 
determines the number of years, in which the fiscal income generated from the saccharin 
operations cover the annualized research expenses for a similar project. Based on the total 
research investment for five years of $44,000 calculated above, it is assumed that the annual 
expenses amount to $9,000. After indexing the fiscal incomes of all years to 1876,24 it is 
determined whether the income of an individual year suffices to pay either less than one third 
of the expenses; between one third and 100 percent of the expenses; between one and three 
times the expenses; between three and six times the expenses; or, finally, more than six times 
the expenses. The results for the four scenarios are shown in Figure 1. 
24 The purchasing power index and the gross domestic product deflators published by Officer, Lawrence H. & 
Williamson, Samuel H., MeasuringWorth, www.measuringworth.com (last access 30 June 2013), 2011, were 
used for the calculations, as there is no perfect measure for the values to be indexed. However, the final results of 
the two methods do not differ substantially and therefore only the result obtained with the purchasing power 
index is shown. 
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 Figure 1. Annual number of research projects fundable with fiscal income from saccharin operations 
 
In 11 years of the realistic scenario, therefore, the annual expenses of more than six 
research projects of a similar scale could be financed with the fiscal income flowing from 
Monsanto’s saccharin operations, equating – conservatively calculated – to about 66 ‘project 
years’ in total. Similarly, in 13 years more than three times the annual expenses of a project 
could be covered, equating to 39 ‘project years’ and in 11 years more than one such project 
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could be financed. In total this means that during the 72 years of Monsanto’s saccharin 
operations the annual research expenses of a similar research project could be covered at least 
116 times or, alternatively stated, at least more than 1.5 similarly-sized projects could be 
funded on average every year with the tax payments.  
 
4. Discussion 
 
We have demonstrated our research evaluation approach based on tax payments with the 
example of saccharin. The returns on the fundamental research project, which led to the 
discovery of saccharin, are quite substantial since they can cover the research expenditures of 
this project and, additionally, for the expenditures of many (116), similarly-sized, projects. 
Nevertheless, the returns are relatively low compared to rates known from econometric 
studies and considering the uncertainties involved in fundamental research. In the following 
we discuss the factors that influenced the results of the calculations and their importance for 
the application of our method to other evaluation settings. 
Long-term evaluation studies of fundamental research in particular often suffer from 
problems related to discounting. Significant time lags between the actual discovery and its 
market introduction – in the example, this lag lasted from 1878 to 1901 – reduce the value of 
the discounted incomes as well as the internal rate of return, as they represent periods 
requiring discounting without producing incomes. Furthermore, considering an average 
product lifecycle, early incomes, which by definition are less heavily discounted, are lower 
compared to later periods, when the product is established. In the case of saccharin and 
Monsanto, this effect was very pronounced: firstly, market sales at the turn of the century 
were rather low; secondly, Monsanto dominated the market only after the mid-twenties; 
thirdly, tax rates were minimal until World War I. In addition to that, saccharin cannot be 
considered to be a regular consumer product for many years, as the sales were restricted by 
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the government (see Table 1). Saccharin turnovers in a free market environment probably 
would have been substantially bigger. 
As mentioned in Section 2, the tax-based approach can be conducted on different levels of 
complexity. Our study on saccharin including only Monsanto’s tax payments, on the one 
hand, allowed for an in-depth examination of the case; on the other hand, this reduced of 
course the comparability to econometric studies, for instance, which assess entire industries. 
Still, in future studies it is possible to apply our method to a set of companies or even to an 
industry, as detailed in the conclusion below. Regarding other aspects, our calculations are 
also rather conservative. For instance, the taxes paid by Monsanto’s employees, owners and 
shareowners, and those of other companies in the value chain (suppliers of raw materials and 
vendors of saccharin) were not included. Also, import duties on raw materials, saccharin or 
saccharin intermediates, as well as value added tax were ignored. Going even one step back, a 
complete valuation would have to include tax income arising from intangible effects of 
Remsen’s research as well, such as knowledge creation beyond saccharin and training of 
skilled graduates. From a methodological point of view, it is conceivable to include such 
factors in studies conducted with our approach. However, the determination of their value 
might involve a series of assumptions and estimations, which would not increase the 
reliability of such a study. 
Of course, as pointed out by David et al. (1992), there are only few new products that 
completely lack substitutes. When saccharin was commercialized, it was on the one hand the 
first non-caloric synthetic sweetener known, but on the other hand it competed in the ‘market 
for sweetness’ with sugar. It is, however, very difficult to estimate the true substitution effect 
of saccharin consumption. Ballinger suggested that, ‘[d]ecreased sugar sales probably 
amounted to less than 100,000 tons in 1965, although total usage of noncaloric sweeteners 
[saccharin and cyclamate] was equivalent in sweetness to about 343,000 tons of refined 
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sugar.’25 Compared to the nine million tons of refined sugar, which were consumed in 1965 in 
the United States, the substitution effect seems small. During wartimes when sugar was 
scarce, there was probably no substitution effect at all. In the fifties, the discovery of 
cyclamates showed further that saccharin is not unique as also other research could lead to a 
non-caloric sweetener representing a substitute for saccharin. To increase the validity of 
future studies conducted with our approach, the influence of such substitution effects on the 
tax payments could be estimated. However, it was beyond the scope of the present research to 
compare the value of saccharin to all its non-caloric sweetener substitutes, as implied by 
David et al. (1992). 
For the present case, we relied heavily on archival material for our calculations. Despite 
being an extensive and largely untapped source of data, the associated limitations should be 
noted. The intentions underlying the creation of a document – e.g. an annual report, meeting 
minutes or correspondence – can influence its content and thus the information that is derived 
from it. To prevent possible biases we have considered several different sources for our 
calculations whenever available, making the procedure more laborious. Nevertheless, some 
fluctuations in our time series might be related to the use of archival material of various kinds. 
The impact of single fluctuations on the overall result is, however, small. As mentioned in 
Section 2, it is possible to rely on other data sources for future studies based on our approach. 
In an ideal case, data obtained directly from companies could enhance the reliability of the 
calculations. Furthermore, to increase external validity it would be beneficial to conduct 
studies on several research projects based on comparable data sources, e.g. corporate data.  
The end result of an evaluation study based on our method depends not only on the 
income generated by the commercialization of an innovation and the sources used to estimate 
it, but also on the associated research expenditures and the setting of appropriate boundaries 
25 Ballinger, iv. 
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regarding projects to be included or excluded from the considerations (Marjanovic et al. 
2009). Regarding research costs, the focus in the present study was laid on Remsen’s group at 
The Johns Hopkins University, leaving out his previous research in Germany and in 
Williamstown, MA, as well as complementary research in organic chemistry. However, we 
included all the initial expenses to furnish his laboratory from scratch, outlays for his entire 
group – not only for the research leading to ‘benzoic sulfinide’ – and a period of five years, 
although the compound was discovered already after two years. The research costs are 
therefore reasonably calculated and very unlikely underestimated. 
Of course, the investment in Remsen’s research does not reflect the total cost involved to 
arrive at saccharin as a research result – an issue that is not unique to our study. ‘Because of 
the cumulative nature of science, this total investment may have extended over decades or 
centuries’ (Mansfield 1991: 6). However, first of all, at the time Remsen started his research 
at The Johns Hopkins University these were sunk costs (ibid.). Secondly, as Griliches (1958) 
showed, the problem can be reduced ad absurdum when taking more and more past research 
into consideration. Lastly, the compilation of the benefits is limited as well by focusing on 
Monsanto’s tax payments only, which balances the effect. 
The costs associated with the commercialization of a research result are generally not 
limited to the direct expenses of the research group(s) involved. They include further 
developmental work and other expenditures contributing to a successful market introduction. 
These costs need to be considered for studies based on our approach, as long as they were 
publicly financed. In the case of saccharin, Fahlberg’s expenses for the synthesis optimization 
as well as for the commissioned safety studies should be excluded as they were compensated 
by private profits. To increase the validity of our study, on the other hand, the costs associated 
with publicly funded safety studies – for instance the Remsen board – would need to be 
considered. 
43 
 
Furthermore, it is conceivable that some projects associated with average research costs 
require above-average investments for commercialization. This could possibly translate into 
higher sales margins and thus higher returns on the initial research outlays when calculated 
with our method. However, this fact does not represent a flaw of our approach; private 
investors will only commit large amounts of resources to commercialization when they can 
expect high returns. Of course, such high returns are associated with high tax payments and 
thus higher benefits in regard of the initial research investment. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that saccharin was commercialized rather linearly (Warner 
2008). Although this might be common in chemistry (David et al. 1992), other innovations are 
frequently based on knowledge diffusion from several different research areas. Such research 
can be evaluated with our method as well, but the process might be more complex. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Herein we have proposed that tax payments accruing from the commercialization of 
research findings can be used to assess the economic returns to publicly funded research. Our 
method can potentially complement existing tools in future evaluation studies. We have 
discussed the advantages of our approach – the use of a direct measure, its intuitiveness, the 
consideration of different levels of complexity, the need of fewer theoretical assumptions 
compared to other assessment tools and its applicability to different types of research – and 
described its limitations – only projects that led or will lead to identifiable tax-relevant 
impacts can be considered. 
We have demonstrated the application of our approach with the example of saccharin and 
we found a conservatively calculated benefit to cost ratio of more than ten to one and an 
internal rate of return of more than seven per cent. From an annualized perspective, on 
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average more than 1.5 similarly-sized research projects could have been sustained in every 
single of Monsanto’s 72 years of saccharin production with the respective tax payments.  
Although the case offered a unique long-term valuation perspective, due to the discovery 
of saccharin already in 1878, our study seen individually cannot serve for public 
accountability purposes, which have gained popularity (Arnold and Balázs 1998; Luukkonen-
Gronow 1987). However, future research evaluation studies could benefit from the application 
of our approach in addition to the established methods, as the latter largely neglected tax 
payments.  
In the context of quantitative evaluations of publicly funded R&D programs offices or 
agencies collect data on the respective research expenses. These data can be used to 
complement the studies with an assessment of the economic effects with our approach. The 
strategies to obtain the additionally required information on tax incomes vary depending on 
the specifics of the programs under evaluation. Cases having broad impacts on many 
companies or even an entire industry will benefit from the estimations of tax revenues in 
sector studies. For instance, the economic contributions of the biotechnology industry to the 
US economy including its tax revenues were assessed by Ernst & Young (2000). By contrast, 
in cases having specific impacts on a clearly identifiable set of companies, e.g. licensees, the 
agencies should collaborate with these companies – ensuring confidentiality – to obtain 
appropriate data. Perhaps the provision of data could even be included in the licensing 
contracts. 
An entire team of evaluators could further pay attention to the aspects neglected in the 
valuation of saccharin as mentioned in the discussion above. Thus, complementing future 
evaluation studies with our approach could lead to a more complete appreciation of the 
economic impacts of publicly funded research, as there is no general method, which can take 
into account all the influences of basic research at once (Tassey 2003). 
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